Building a better market by Vanessa Sumo
28 Region Focus • Winter 2008
I
n his influential 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,”
economics Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase asked
why firms exist. Firms typically combine different
activities such as production, marketing, inventory, or
human resources management under one roof. But these
activities could also be produced independently by sub-
contractors, for instance. Transactions between these dif-
ferent units could take place in markets, and price
movements would ensure that resources are allocated 
efficiently. So, why do we need firms? Why do some trans-
actions take place within firms and others between firms
or people in markets? 
Coase’s answer was that there may be certain limitations
to relying entirely on the market’s invisible hand. Such con-
straints might make the price tag of obtaining a commodity
or service higher than its actual cost. For instance, there can
be significant costs to searching and bargaining with each
supplier. But certain costs may be avoided if the supply 
of inputs, especially services, can be guaranteed over a
longer period. By bringing various activities under one roof,
a firm may be able to substantially reduce these transactions
costs. Thus, the size of the firm partly depends on how large
these costs are.
The theory of mechanism design — which has received 
much attention since three of its pioneers (Leonid Hurwicz,
Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson) won last year’s Nobel 
Prize in economics — provides a framework for thinking
more generally about how such frictions affect the way a 
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market, a firm, or any other mechanism
works in allocating the economy’s
resources. A market is a particular type
of mechanism, where the amount of a
commodity traded and its price are
determined by a large number of buyers
and sellers without any intervention.
Unfettered markets often perform best,
because the price signal that comes out
of these interactions ensures that no
resources are wasted. 
However, when one party in a
transaction has more information
than the other, the invisible hand 
may not work as well as it should.
Problems associated with such infor-
mation frictions are particularly acute
in the market for providers and 
users of funds, and this is one of the 
many fields where applications of
mechanism design theory have made
significant contributions. 
Say an investor decides to provide
funds to an entrepreneur, and he in
turn promises to pay the investor 
some portion of a project’s output.
The tricky part is that the investor
may not always be able to observe
what the entrepreneur is doing, nor
can he be sure that the entrepreneur 
will be truthful in reporting the pro-
ject’s earnings. As such, a substantial
amount of effort will have to be spent
in trying to overcome this information
asymmetry.
But there could be a better way.
Mechanism design gives us the tools to
design the rules of the game in such 
a way that it minimizes the costs 
of limited information, while recog-
nizing that people are always looking 
out for their own self-interest, a basic 
constraint of any type of mechanism.
This could lead to the emergence 
of particular contracts and institutions
such as financial intermediaries. In the
end, the result may not have been
guided by the invisible hand, but given
the information constraints we face
everyday, it is certainly an outcome
that makes everyone better off. 
Debt as the Optimal Contract 
Financial markets offer a rich and
complex array of instruments to
finance business activities. Broadly
speaking, however, one can divide 
the means to provide funds into two
categories: debt, which is an amount
of money owed in the form of bank
loans or bonds; and equity, which are
ownership rights to a firm in the form
of shares.
Economists Franco Modigliani and 
Merton Miller, both Nobel Prize win-
ners, are well-known for showing that
the market value of a firm is unaffect-
ed by the way a company chooses to
fund its operations. “The cream plus
the skim milk would bring the same
price as the whole milk,” explained
Miller in Financial Innovations and
Market Volatility, a book that was pub-
lished in 1991. For instance, a company
may prefer to issue more debt if the
cost of borrowing through issuing
bonds is lower than the required
return on issuing stocks. However, as
the amount of leverage increases, the
return on equity demanded by
investors will go up as well, because
the company is now perceived to be a
riskier bet. Thus, the overall cost of
capital of the new debt and equity mix
turns out to be the same. A company’s
choice of a capital structure should be
irrelevant. 
But while the logic of Miller and
Modigliani’s proposition is certainly
true, there is something about the real
world that weakens this insight.
Companies and financial markets do
seem to care about a company’s mix of
debt and equity. The choice of financ-
ing matters. 
This has prompted some econo-
mists to think about how entering 
one type of contract could affect a
borrower’s behavior, particularly when
he has more information about his
project than the person financing it.
The theory of mechanism design is
helpful in answering this question.
In certain situations, the optimal
contract design will look like a debt
contract, according to economist
Robert Townsend of the University of
Chicago. To understand his 1979 analy-
sis, one can think of an entrepreneur
who has an idea for a project but 
doesn’t have enough funds to start the
business. The entrepreneur predicts
that the endeavor will generate a cer-
tain stream of income. In order to
finance this project, he can offer
investors a contract that pays a por-
tion of its earnings. The difficult part
is that investors will not be able to
observe how well the business is doing
as accurately as the entrepreneur 
can. Thus, investors will naturally want
to verify the entrepreneur’s output
because they will be reluctant to
finance the project otherwise.
But auditing entails an extra
expense, and if the investor incurs this
cost then he will likely demand a 
higher return on his investment. So,
while the entrepreneur may be able to
secure the funds he needs, the cost of
undertaking the project will become
more expensive than if there were
some other way for investors to avoid
what Townsend calls “costly state veri-
fication.” One way to do this is to
design a contract that helps the
investor avoid auditing the project to
the fullest extent possible but will still
be willing to finance the project. 
What would such a contract look
like? Townsend finds that it resembles
what we commonly know as debt. In
return for providing funds, an entre-
preneur agrees to pay the investor a
fixed amount of money, which
includes some return on his invest-
ment. Because he’s receiving a flat
sum, the investor does not need to 
verify the entrepreneur’s output under
all circumstances, as he would have 
if his pay depended on a share of the
entrepreneur’s earnings. However, 
if the entrepreneur cannot meet 
this payment — that is, if
the project becomes insol-
vent—then the investor
will go in, audit the 
project, and take
whatever is left. 
In this mecha-
nism, it is always
in the entrepre-
neur’s best interest
to tell the truth about
what he’s earned because
he knows that if he pretends to have a
lower output, the investor will be
forced to audit him. Townsend 30 Region Focus • Winter 2008
suggests this contract is opti-
mal because the investor
doesn’t need to evaluate the
entrepreneur all the time,
nor does he have to worry too much
about getting less than he bargained
for. The entrepreneur is actually much
happier too. Because the investor
saves on the costs of verification, the
entrepreneur can obtain funds for his
project at a lower price. 
When Equity is Better than Debt
An entrepreneur may have two rea-
sons why he would want to raise funds
from an outsider. First, he may not
have enough money to fund the 
project himself. Second, he probably
doesn’t like uncertainty (most people
don’t) and would prefer to share the
risk of running the business. If all 
parties had equal information — that
is, if an outsider could see perfectly at
all times what the entrepreneur is
doing — then the best thing that the
entrepreneur can do is offload all of
the risk of the project. He could sell all
the ownership shares of the business
to as many people as possible, elimi-
nate his risk entirely, and simply
receive a fixed salary. Investors would
happily buy these shares because they
could perfectly observe the project’s
results.
The problem again is that, in the
real world, the entrepreneur will typi-
cally have better information than his
investors. This prevents the entrepre-
neur from shedding all of the risk of
the project, because investors know
that he will have an incentive to lie
about his results. Thus, in order to
encourage investors to finance his
project, an entrepreneur will have to
assume some of the risk by owning
part of the business. How much risk-
sharing would be stipulated in the
contract depends on how strong 
the entrepreneur’s incentives are to
fudge the books, according to a 1989
analysis by a pair of economists at the
Richmond Fed, President Jeff Lacker
and John Weinberg. “That split
between inside and outside ownership
is determined by the cost of manipu-
lating information,” Weinberg says.
Manipulating information, or “fal-
sification,” can exist in a number of
forms. In sharecropping, a landowner
lets a tenant farm his land in exchange
for a share of the crops, giving the 
tenant an opportunity to hide some 
of the crop before the landowner
comes to collect his share. In medieval
Venice, risky long-distance trade 
voyages were financed by investors 
on land, allowing the traveling mer-
chant to unload valuable goods at
another location. The opportunity to
falsify results is present in modern
contractual settings as well, such as
when a manager might be tempted to
cook the company accounts. 
But falsification comes at a cost.
“Falsifying records that are made 
available to the public, if nothing else,
results in the cost of keeping two 
sets of records,” wrote Lacker and
Weinberg. Even the sheer effort of
planning the logistics of hiding stolen
goods can be costly, as it might be for
someone who has to remain discrete
after diverting company funds. In a
world where falsification is tempting
but costly, investors would only be
willing to finance the entrepreneur’s
project if the risk of the project can 
be shared between them. Thus, the
optimal contract is an equity contract. 
The cheaper it is to cheat, the 
larger the share of the risk that the
entrepreneur will need to hold. So,
ownership shares in an equity contract
would be based on how costly it is to
falsify results. A larger share held by
the entrepreneur will discourage him
from diverting a chunk of the project’s
output because his total income
depends not only on his “unofficial”
spoils but also on his “official” share of
the output. While he may be more
tempted to cheat when falsification is
easy, he would have to weigh this deci-
sion against the larger loss of income
from reporting a low official output.  
So what is the best contract
between borrowers and lenders: debt
or equity? In Townsend’s model, debt
is the optimal contract because the
output cannot be publicly observed, so
the investors have to take a costly
action to verify the entrepreneur’s
results. In Lacker and Weinberg’s
analysis, the output is publicly
observed but can be altered by the
entrepreneur. It is the entrepreneur
who takes the costly action to falsify
results, such that the investors require
entrepreneurs to share some of the
risk of the project. “You might specu-
late that if the information structure is
yet more complicated where there are
aspects of both costly verification and
costly falsification, you might have a
combination of debt and equity,”
Weinberg explains.
That might illustrate the real world
more accurately.  Companies do seem
to hold a mix of both types of con-
tracts. But the question of how to
divide up the company’s cash flows
between its lenders and shareholders
is only one aspect of the company’s
choice of a capital structure. Another
important consideration has to do
with more complicated concerns of
what the chosen mix of debt and 
equity implies for the right to govern
or make decisions in an organization.
Indeed, the distinction between debt
and equity encompasses all these
issues and continues to be a topic 
of active research interest among
financial economists.
The Rise of the Intermediary
Borrowers and lenders can turn to 
a financial intermediary, such as a
bank, whenever they have a hard time
finding each other. A lender puts
money in a bank, which will use these
funds to finance an entrepreneur’s
project. Without an intermediary, the
lender would need to figure out
whether a borrower is creditworthy. If
many lenders are involved,
perhaps to spread the risk
of financing a big project,
then each lender would
have to perform the
same task of monitor-
ing the entrepreneur.
This is clearly a waste-
ful duplication of effort.
Thus, an intermediary
that makes it its business to know
what the entrepreneur is doing may be
the best arrangement for everybody.Intermediaries have the law of large
numbers on their side, according to a
1984 analysis by economist Douglas
Diamond of the Graduate School of
Business at the University of Chicago,
and visiting scholar at the Richmond
Fed. Not all borrowers are alike.
Lending to a large number of borrow-
ers drives down the uncertainty of the
investment return. Thus, the presence
of intermediaries not only minimizes
the cost of monitoring but it also
reduces the costs of signaling to the
lender that it can be trusted. If the
lender has to make a decision
between entrusting his
funds to an entrepreneur
or through an intermedi-
ary, he will choose the
intermediary because diver-
sification assures him of
getting his money back.
But intermediaries also
play an important role in addressing
the problem of adverse selection —
what happens when borrowers with
low-grade projects are inadvertently
chosen over those with high-quality
projects because a project’s true 
quality may be known only to the
entrepreneur. Intermediaries guide
the allocation of resources by making
sure that good projects get funding
first. Intermediaries can achieve this
by designing so-called “incentive com-
patible” contracts, according to a 1986
paper by economist John Boyd of the
University of Minnesota and Nobel
Prize winner Edward C. Prescott of
Arizona State University and the
Minneapolis Fed. 
Incentive compatible contracts are
at the heart of mechanism design
theory. Entrepreneurs can be offered
contracts based on the project’s 
quality and realized returns. The con-
tract for good projects is designed so
that entrepreneurs with bad projects
have no incentive to pretend they have
good projects. Faking it would be more
costly to this entrepreneur. He may be
better off simply investing his money 
in someone else’s project through an
intermediary.
With the intermediary at the 
center of the transaction offering the
right menu of contracts, the result 
is an effective separation of good 
and bad projects. This outcome is 
efficient in that the economy’s
resources are put to the best use 
possible. The intermediary does not
have to waste time and money check-
ing on those who are pretending to
have projects that are better than they
really are.
Another paper by Lacker and
Weinberg published in 1993 likewise
finds that an intermediary is essential
to an arrangement that allows funds 
to be distributed to potential users 
in the best possible way. Similar 
to Boyd and Prescott, they conclude 
that the optimal result would be 
hard to achieve in a bond market
where borrowers issue bonds directly 
to lenders. While an intermediary 
can offer a menu of loan contracts 
at different prices, which is a key ele-
ment in separating project types,
competition in bond markets would
force those prices to converge. This
would lead to a less desirable outcome
since the bad projects would crowd
out the good ones.  “A [bond market]
would lead to setting that threshold
too low so people with less productive
projects actually get funding,” explains
Weinberg. “An intermediary can 
actually set the threshold higher 
and screen off those less productive 
projects.”
All of these contributions have
increased economists’ understanding
of how market outcomes can be
improved whenever the lack of  infor-
mation prevents markets from
achieving the most desirable
result. A market mechanism can
find the equilibrium where supply
equals demand. However,
as in bond markets, the
market outcome doesn’t
differentiate between
good and bad types.
And being able to distin-
guish between types is important
for efficiency, which is the 
ultimate objective of a well-function-
ing economic mechanism. 
But economists are still hard 
at work trying to figure out all 
the consequences of information 
frictions. “Even to the extent of 
knowing what we mean by equili-
brium in a setting with adverse 
selection is a harder question to
answer than it is in the simpler case of
symmetric information,” says
Weinberg. Fortunately, the theory
mechanism design has enriched the
way economists think about these 
problems.                RF
Winter 2008 • Region Focus 31
Boyd, John H., and Edward C. Prescott. “Financial Intermediary
Coalitions.” Journal of Economic Theory, April 1986, vol. 38, no. 2, 
pp. 211-232.
Coase, Ronald H. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 
New Series, November 1937, vol. 4, no. 16. pp. 386-405.
Diamond, Douglas W. “Financial Intermediation and Delegated
Monitoring.” The Review of Economic Studies, July 1984, vol. 51, 
vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 393-414.
Lacker, Jeffrey M., and John A. Weinberg. “ACoalition Proof 
Equilibrium for a Private Information Credit Economy.” 
Economic Theory, June 1993, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 279-296.
____. “Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification,”
Journal of Political Economy, December 1989, vol. 97, pp.1345-1363.
Miller, Merton H. Financial Innovations and Market Volatility.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1991.
Townsend, Robert M. “Optimal Contracts and Competitive
Markets with Costly State Verification.” Journal of Economic Theory,
October 1979, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 265-293.
R EADINGS